The foreign policy-making processes in Cameroon are highly personalised matters and have been dominated by the governing style and personality of Presidents Amadou Ahidjo and Paul Biya, respectively. Bilateralism appeared to be Cameroon’s preferred diplomatic interaction following independence but it somehow adopted a more open, multilateral and aggressive diplomatic overture within the international arena under the Biya regime to argue for its continued possession of the Bakassi Peninsula. This policy brief examines Cameroon’s diplomacy towards Nigeria during the Bakassi Peninsula crisis. When Nigeria disputed Cameroon’s ownership of the peninsula, she sought the assistance and arbitration of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague. This was in sharp contrast to its prior non-contentious, low-profile approach in its international engagements. Though Cameroon has previously provided two successive Secretary-Generals of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), she has assumed a more subdued and subtle approach in multilateral organisations. The policy brief focuses on Cameroon’s sudden change in diplomatic engagement and attributes such change to the perceived threat of Nigeria over its sovereignty on the Bakassi Peninsula.

**Keywords:** Cameroon, Bakassi Peninsula, Bilateralism, Nigeria, Diplomacy

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Introduction

Cameroon became a German protectorate in 1884 after Gustav Nactigal signed annexation treaties over littoral Cameroon with the Kings of Duala and Akwa. Prior to 1884, the territory was a vast expanse of land inhabited by centralised and segmented polities. Portuguese, French and British merchants had over the years established trading posts along its coastline. By 1858 Alfred Saker, a British missionary, had crossed into Cameroon from Fernando Po and landed on the foot of Mount Cameroon and founded Victoria, to-day known as Limbe. An official British envoy was sent to sign annexation treaties with the Kings of the Bimbia; unfortunately he arrived just days after the Germans had established a foothold in the territory. However, the German pacification of the territory continued and an effective implantation of German colonial administration was completed only by 1908, after the capture of Mora in the far northern tip of the territory and the erection of a German garrison there. Soon thereafter, the First World War broke out in Europe and the territory was attacked by British and French troops from Nigeria and French Equatorial Africa, respectively. By 1916 the German forces in Cameroon had been defeated and an Anglo-French condominium was established in the territory. The condominium failed and the territory was divided along Milner/Simon line. The agreement between the British and the French stipulated that one-third of the territory would be given to the British and administered as part of the eastern region of Nigeria. The balance of three-quarters would be given to the French and administered as part of French Equatorial Africa. This ad hoc arrangement was formalised by the League of Nations in 1923 as the territories were handed to the British and French as East and West Cameroon Mandated Territories. After the creation of the United Nations in 1945, the two territories were again entrusted to Britain and France as UN Trusteeships in 1946. The French part achieved independence on 1 January 1960, whereas the British-controlled section was granted autonomy through the 11 February 1961 plebiscite. The two territories became the Federal Republic of Cameroon on 1 October 1961, after the promulgation of the federal constitution by the joint House of Assemblies.

When the Cameroon Federation was created, it portrayed itself as an embodiment of unity in diversity, in the pursuance of an African-based non-aligned diplomacy. The dual-cultural background meant Cameroon would find favour in both the French community and the British Commonwealth. Yet, departing from this strong diplomatic standpoint, Cameroon’s diplomacy can best be described as a double diplomatic absence as no indelible mark was made within these important diplomatic fora. Several reasons have been put forward in order to justify Cameroon’s lacklustre diplomatic presence, one being its recurrent border dispute with Nigeria.

Despite this understanding, it is important to note that transborder incursions and territorial litigation became common occurrences among African states soon after independence in 1960. The same could be said of the territorial claims between the Republic of Cameroon and the Federal Republic of Nigeria, since both countries gained independence in 1960. The claims and counterclaims by both these countries on certain areas along their common boundary are also informed by the fact that boundary litigation was a fairly new concept in Africa geo-political thinking in the 1960s. Though the Berlin Africa Conference of 1884–85 had arrived at a tacit understanding that colonial boundaries should be respected, no recourse was discussed to ensure that colonial boundaries take into account ethnic and natural geographical realities on the ground. Colonial boundaries in Africa therefore did not take into cognisance natural boundaries such as rivers, ethnic borders, mountains or forests, as the case may be. Boundaries were drawn based on the economic value of the area and on the whims and caprices of the coloniser. One of the fundamental questions that beset the newly formed Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 was how to lessen the propensity of African states to take up arms against one another across their common border. It was agreed that all colonial boundaries should be respected and should form part of international law. This OAU standpoint was informed amongst others by the squabbles between Cameroon and Nigeria, Libya and Chad over the Aouzou strip, the Mali/Mauritania border crisis and the Nigeria/Benin dispute over fishery enclaves.

Despite these territorial claims, areas that have shown potential for natural resources and economic growth have seen greater efforts by one country to forcibly establish sovereignty over such areas at the expense of another country. Within the realm of the Cameroon/Nigeria border skirmishes, the crisis was exacerbated by the hitherto unexplored high potential of crude oil deposits and multinational oil companies showing considerable interest in the area. The rapidly expanding economies of the West and a waning supply of oil amid a continuing Middle East crisis, mean that African oil deposits...
offer a significant alternative to the erstwhile ‘traditional’ oil supply route. The increasing expansion of the Nigerian economy has created an enormous appetite for oil, which to a large extent may provide a strong incentive to acquire territories with such potential.

The purpose of the policy brief is to examine Cameroon’s diplomatic overtures towards Nigeria as a result of her quarrel with the latter over the Bakassi Peninsula. It departs from the assumption that the sheer weight of Nigeria’s diplomatic presence on the continent may have influenced Cameroon’s approach to seek an international arbiter in order to resolve the crisis.

Cameroon’s Bilateral Diplomacy with Nigeria

The foreign policy-making processes in Cameroon are a highly personalised matter and have been dominated by the governing style and personality of Presidents Amadou Ahidjo and Paul Biya, respectively. Both have had far-reaching impact on Cameroon diplomacy and have been at the centre of whether Cameroon diplomacy is aggressive or passive on certain fundamental international issues that Cameroon holds dear. Governed by both presidents, Cameroon has engaged in a non-contentious, low-profile approach in international gatherings. Within international fora, Cameroon supports the principle of non-interference in the affairs of third countries and has supported increased assistance to underdeveloped countries. Its commitment to causes such as international peacekeeping, the rule of law, environmental protection and its non-confrontational approach has inevitably led to the avoidance of criticism of other countries.

Despite the preponderance of multilateral organisations such as the UN and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), effective diplomacy is achieved at the bilateral level. Bilateralism refers to trade or political relations between two states. At the dawn of political independence several African countries embarked on bilateral relations with their former colonial powers and with other African countries. Trade treaties and diplomatic relations were established and ambassadors exchanged.

Following independence, Cameroon embarked on both a bilateral and multilateral diplomatic trajectory. Within the bilateral realm, diplomatic relations were established with several European and African countries. Owing to historical exigencies, Nigeria was one of the first countries with which Cameroon established diplomatic and trade relations in the early 1960s. However, for a number of years relations between the two countries were strained over issues relating to their 1,600 kilometre boundary, extending from Lake Chad to the Bakassi Peninsula. Amongst the issues involved are the rights over the oil-rich land and sea reserves, and the fate of the local populations.

After the 2002 International Court of Justice (ICJ) verdict ceding the territory to Cameroon, the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, established a Mixed Commission comprising representatives of Cameroon, Nigeria and the UN ‘to consider ways of following up on the ICJ ruling and moving the process forward’. The commission was chaired by the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for West Africa, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallahi. The Cameroon delegation was led by Amadou Ali, Cameroon Minister of Justice and the Nigerian delegation by Prince Bola Ajibola, former Minister of Justice. The Mixed Commission’s mandate covered the following areas:

- Demarcation of the land boundary between the two countries
- Withdrawal of civil administration, military and police forces and transfer of authority in relevant areas along the boundary
- The eventual demilitarisation of the Bakassi Peninsula
- The need to protect the rights of the affected populations in both countries
- Development of projects to promote joint economic ventures and cross-border cooperation
- Reactivation of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC)

In pursuit of these objectives, the Mixed Commission established the following subsidiary organs which included experts from the two parties and the UN:

- A Sub-Commission responsible for the demarcation of the land boundary between the two countries, with a Joint Technical Team, composed of technical experts and responsible for carrying out field assessments of the boundary and supervising the demarcation work carried out by outside contractors.
- A Sub-Commission on affected populations with a mandate to assess the situation of these populations and to consider effective ways to ensure protection of their rights.
- A Working Group on the withdrawal of civil administration and military and police forces
and the transfer of authority in the Lake Chad area.

- A Working Group on Withdrawals and Transfers of Authority in the Land Boundary.
- An Observer Team responsible for following-up on the withdrawal and transfer of authority in the land boundary and the Lake Chad area.
- A Working Group on the maritime boundary.
- A Working Group on withdrawals and transfers of authority in the Bakassi Peninsula.

The Mixed Commission has so far achieved its objectives. First, the withdrawal of Cameroon and Nigerian civil administration, military and police forces around the Lake Chad area was completed in December 2003 with some 33 villages handed over to Cameroon and Dambore to Nigeria. The commission has successfully demarcated the maritime boundary between the two countries. On 14 August 2008 the Bakassi Peninsular was officially handed to Cameroon and all Nigerian civil and military personnel withdrew. Though sporadic skirmishes between the Cameroon gendarmerie and rebels opposed to the handover of the peninsular to Cameroon are a recurrent phenomenon in the area, both Cameroon and Nigeria consider the Bakassi Peninsular dispute a thing of the past and both have been putting in place strategies to ameliorate the lives and living conditions of the riparian population.

**Cameroon’s Diplomacy after Independence**

In 1958 the then former East Cameroon voted overwhelmingly to remain within the Francophone community, as did a majority of other French African colonies. Though political independence was granted on 1 January 1960, France continued to exercise control over Cameroon’s foreign policy direction. Although Amadou Ahidjo, Cameroon’s founding president, chose to join the Monrovia Group as opposed to Kwame Nkrumah’s radical Casablanca Group or the French-African dominated Brazzaville Group, there is no gainsaying that the country played a determinant role in the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963. This determinant role was manifested by the fact that Cameroon provided two successive Secretary-Generals of the OAU in the persons of Nzo Ekangaki and William Eketi Mboumoua. Cameroon diplomacy underwent a hiatus under the Biya regime as the grandiose days of the Ahidjo era dissipated into the doldrums of diplomatic stagnation. Since that time she has had little presence at continental and global gatherings.

Despite this lacklustre presence, Cameroon has continued to pay her dues to multilateral organisations such as the African Union (AU), the UN, the Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC), the LCBC and the Niger Basin Commission. Backdoor diplomatic activities by Cameroon have led to the election of Cameroonians to posts of responsibility within international organisations. They include Dorothy Njouma, a member of the Panel of Eminent Persons of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), Elizabeth Tankeu, Commissioner of Trade and Industry at the AU and Barrister Akere Muna, President of UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Although Cameroon has taken a gradualist approach to the concept of a United States of Africa, her focused approach and determination to seek arbitration in her border dispute with Nigeria are some of her diplomatic achievements which overshadow many of her previously erratic forays into international politics.

In seeking out the good offices of the Secretary-General of the UN and submitting her quarrel over the Bakassi Peninsular to the ICJ at the Hague, suggests that Cameroon believed that bilateralism as a diplomatic option in resolving the crisis had failed or may not have worked. Several issues could explain such a decision. First, Cameroon cannot risk a war with Nigeria as it would be catastrophic for both sides. Secondly, the sheer size and sophistication of the Nigerian army is a significant deterrent. Cameroon was counting on the support of France but evidence suggests that French investment in Nigeria far surpasses her investments in Cameroon. Therefore, in the case of open conflict France would most likely either remain neutral or in an extreme case, support Nigeria in order to protect her interests and investments in that country. Thirdly, an important Cameroon CEMAC ally, Equatorial Guinea, has since the onset of the conflict openly sided with Nigeria. Cameroon was therefore constrained by such exigencies to abandon bilateral discussions and engage with multilateral institutions in order to resolve the crisis.

**The Crisis**

The delimitations of the Cameroon/Nigeria boundary were the subject of intense rivalry between the Germans and the British. The latter, who colonised Cameroon, insisted on a de jure boundary to lay to rest the territorial disputes between the
chiefs of old Calabar and the chiefs of Bimbia over fishing ports and forest products. The negotiations culminated in the Anglo-German Agreement of 11 March 1913, delimiting the maritime boundary between the two states. The Milner-Simon Declaration of 1919 added further credence to the 1913 agreement. This declaration recognised the right of Cameroon over the Bakassi Peninsula. It took into consideration article 289 of the Versailles Treaty of 1919 which upheld treaties entered into by the Germans, prior to the First World War. The maritime border was delimited a novo by the articles of the Thomson-Marchand Declaration of 1929–30 and again by the Henderson-Fleurian Exchange of Notes of 1931. The declarations and exchange of notes delimited and approved the Cameroon/Nigeria maritime boundary by the United Kingdom and France.

Despite the fact that until 1970 the boundary issue has been tackled by colonists, the two independent states recognised the need to relook at the demarcation process a novo, particularly as remnants of the Biafra army were holed-up in the creeks along the border. The leaders of the two countries met again in Yaoundé, Cameroon, to thrash out the fine details of the border problems raised at the 1970 Yaoundé meeting. The Yaoundé II Declaration of 1971, as the outcome of that meeting was called, recognised and authenticated the 11 March 1913 Anglo-German Agreement and resolved to uphold that particular borderline as delimited in that agreement. Following the Yaoundé II Declaration of 1971 and the ‘cleaning’ of the Bakassi Peninsula by Cameroon of remnants of the Biafran army in the aftermath of the Nigerian civil war, both leaders again met in Garoua in 1975. The Garoua Declaration of 1975 is regarded as the most single act of recognition and assurance by both countries to adhere to the preceding declarations. This reassurance was reflected in the geographical pattern of their oil concession until 1991, where the Anglo-German Agreement was valid and applicable in its entirety. The entente between the two neighbours collapsed when, in 1981 and again on Christmas Day 1993, Nigerian troops invaded the peninsula. The armies of the two countries were holed-up on the peninsula until 14 August 2007, when the ICJ had ruled that the disputed territory belonged to Cameroon.

Immediately after the attack of 1993, Cameroon lodged an official complaint at the ICJ in April 1994. The court admitted that it was competent to hear the matter despite initial objection from Nigeria. The court’s task was to specify definitively the course of the entire Nigeria/Cameroon boundary as fixed by the relevant international instruments. The court was also to pass judgment on the dispute over interpretation or application of certain provisions of those instruments and to investigate to what extent the provisions of these various instruments were authentic. The various arguments raised by the legal team of both countries could be termed controversial and complicated. Nigeria’s claims were based on the premise that the majority of the people in the disputed areas were Nigerians. Nigeria argued that it had maintained unbroken possession over the area with acts of administration, which represents sovereignty. The court ruled that, considering the various instruments presented, Cameroon neither assented to nor agreed to relinquish its title over the area in favour of Nigeria. The court argued that sovereignty over the settlements situated to the east of the boundary continues to lie with Cameroon.

After more than eight years of litigation, the ICJ ruled on 10 October 2002 that the peninsula belonged to Cameroon and that Nigeria should immediately withdraw its troops from the area. The court’s decision was received with mixed feelings in Abuja. Public opinion insisted that Nigerian troops should not be withdrawn from the territory as a matter of national interest. Though then president Obasanjo did not publicly pronounce on the official Nigerian standpoint, at the time many analysts were of the opinion that he was probably weighing the options as not to antagonise or bruise the Nigerian public opinion ego. Efforts have been made to restore calm in the region through the good offices of the Secretary-General of the UN and the LCBC, of which Cameroon and Nigeria are founding members.

Efforts at Reconciliation

On 29 March 1994 the government of Cameroon filed an application in the Registry of the ICJ, instituting proceedings against the government of Nigeria concerning its dispute with Nigeria over the Bakassi Peninsula. Cameroon further stated in its application that the delimitation of the land and maritime boundary has remained a partial one and that despite many attempts to complete it, the two parties have been unable to do so. Consequently, it requested the court to determine the course of the maritime boundary between the two states beyond the line fixed in 1975. On 6 June 1994 Cameroon filed an additional application in the Registry for the purpose of extending the subject of the dispute to a further dispute, described
in the additional application as relating to the question of sovereignty over a part of the territory of Cameroon in the area of Lake Chad. Cameroon requested the court to specify definitively the frontier between the two states from Lake Chad to the sea, a distance of approximately 1,700 km.  

In essence, therefore, bilateralism in probing and resolving conflicts on the continent has been relegated to the backburner of African politics. Multilateral organisations have again been called upon to resolve African problems. Cameroon’s decision to seek recourse from international multilateral organisations for the resolution of the conflict stems from a degree of mistrust in African organisations. It underlines the fact that Africans do not have confidence or trust in their own institutions. At the first sign of tension between the two states, the initial step should have been to approach regional bodies such as the OAU/AU and ECOWAS, but since the belligerents were powerhouses of both these two organisations, it became problematic to submit to their jurisdiction. The LCBC, of which both states are influential members, was also incapacitated by the lack of structures and resources to bring the belligerents to the negotiating table.

The OAU was equally faced with a structural malaise and could not effectively implement or put in place a mechanism for easing the tension between the two countries. While the legal teams of both countries were presenting their claims at The Hague, the International Community of the Red Cross put pressure on the two governments to ease the tension along the border and to release prisoners of war (POWs). Through these initiatives and under the auspices of the Cameroonian president of the Red Cross, William Eteki, 209 Nigerian and 98 Cameroonian POWs were released in August 1996.

After numerous claims and counter-claims, memorial and counter-memorial which centred around the Nigerian arguments that the various declarations of 1971 and 1975 between President of Cameroon, Amadou Ahidjo, and President of Nigeria, Yakubu Gowon, were not binding on Nigeria considering that there were not ratified by the Nigerian parliament, the proceedings continued nonetheless. The Nigerian legal team insinuated that Nigeria and its inhabitants have maintained unbroken possession over the Bakassi Peninsula for hundreds of years without any objection from Cameroon. There was a general perception in Nigeria that the 1971 and 1975 declarations were mere political gimmicks between Muslim brothers, Ahidjo and Gowon, over a Christian territory, which had very little impact on their political future.

On the other hand, Cameroon produced documents from the Anglo-German Agreement of 11 March 1913, the various English and French Exchanges of Notes, the British Order in Council of 1923, the Yaoundé II Declaration of 1971 and the Garoua Declaration of 1975 to substantiate that the Bakassi Peninsula belonged to Cameroon. After more than eight years of litigation, the ICJ at The Hague set 10 October 2002 as the date to pass judgment on the case. The judgment declared the Bakassi territory to be Cameroon territory. Nigeria initially refused to recognise the judgment and insisted that it would not withdraw its troops from the peninsula. To ease the tension between the two countries, the UN Secretary-General convened a meeting with the belligerents and argued for the revival of the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission as the first step in normalising relations between the two countries. The work of the Mixed Commission was to be monitored and chaired by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative to the Bakassi Peninsula, Ambassador Ould Ahmedou Abdallah. The Mixed Commission was mandated to meet every two weeks and was again tasked to demarcate the maritime boundary with the help of UN experts. This still did not ease tension in the peninsula as Nigeria troops continued to dig in, preventing Cameroon from establishing any sort of sovereignty over the disputed area. It is in light of this that both leaders were again invited in New York by the then UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, where after intense negotiation, the 12 June 2006 GreenTree Accord was signed. The accord stipulated that Nigeria would withdraw all its troops in the peninsula within one calendar year. The population residing in the area would either withdraw with the Nigerians troops or accept Cameroon’s sovereignty over the territory. Several other issues relating to immigration, natural resources, security and infrastructure development in the area were debated. The Mixed Commission was tasked to carry out the decisions arrived at during the GreenTree negotiations. In this regard, the commission has successfully delimited the boundary, and this has seen the return to Cameroon of more than 130 villages and to Nigerian of about 25 villages along the Lake Chad Basin area. Nigerian troops were officially withdrawn on 14 August 2007 and Cameroon regained possession of the oil-rich Bakassi Peninsula.
Why Diplomacy should prevail in the Bakassi Peninsular

It is our view that it will take more than the work of Mixed Commissions and political rhetoric to permanently resolve the border conflict. In attempting to propagate a likely scenario to the present crisis, an examination of the past relations between the two countries would be worthwhile. First, southern Cameroon, a predominantly English-speaking region where the disputed peninsula is situated, was administered as part of the eastern region of Nigeria shortly after the First World War until independence on 1 October 1961. The region has been clamouring for over two decades for secession from Cameroon. Secondly, the then Cameroon federation strongly supported the Federal Government of Nigeria during the 1967 to 1970 Nigerian civil war. The Bakassi estuary, which was the only waterway into the secessionists Biafran territory, was blocked by the Cameroon Navy and stifled any Biafran attempt to secure supplies from the outside world. With the above notwithstanding, and the entente cordial that existed between the two Muslim leaders (Gowon and Ahidjo) then paved the way for a future bilateral relationship and an open window between Yaoundé and Abuja. Thirdly, Nigeria has portrayed itself as a champion of democratic tenets in Africa and has on numerous occasions intervened militarily and diplomatically to avert open-armed conflict between countries on the continent. Nigeria is one of the principal initiators and primary funders of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (Nepad). Because of historical imperatives and the liberal democratic tenets which Nigeria has espoused, it would be logical for Nigeria to promote peace and dialogue with Cameroon.

The majority of Nigerian political parties have also opposed armed conflict with Cameroon. A motion instituted in the Nigerian House of Representatives by the Senator for the Bakassi region which was also supported by the traditional leader of Bakassi, Etinyi Etin Okou Edet, for a plebiscite in the region, was rejected in the Nigerian senate. This suggests to what extent the Nigerian authorities wish to resolve the dispute amicably. One important theory which could well explain why Nigeria would not want to risk armed confrontation with Cameroon, is the web of military alliances to which Cameroon is a signatory. Prominent among these is the military assistance pact with France and with members of CEMAC. The military preparedness of Cameroon could also be a major deterrent. Since 1993 the Cameroon armed forces have increased by more than 400 per cent and the budget has increased by a similar amount. Presently, Nigeria is promoting what they call, pax Nigeriana, following many years of military dictatorship. A return to armed conflict in the region would jeopardise the hard-won present dispensation. The fact that there are more than four million Nigerians in Cameroon and less than 100 000 Cameroonian in Nigeria could also be a decisive factor.

Nigerian academia has drummed up support for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. In a recent and highly instructive case study of the Bakassi Peninsula, TAT Yagba, one of Nigerian’s brightest legal experts and Head of the Department of International Law at the Nigeria Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, cautioned that from all legal perspectives the disputed territory belongs to Cameroon and should be peacefully handed to Cameroon. He argued purely on moral grounds, that by virtue of their history Nigeria should never risk a war with Cameroon.24 The then Attorney-General of the Nigerian Federation, Musa E Abdullahi, has echoed Yagba’s sentiments. He cautioned about the fact that ‘it was Cameroon that insinuated legal action against Nigeria in the disputed area suggests that they have opted for a multilateral solution to the dispute and Nigeria would follow the outcome of the court’s ruling’.25 One important issue which has remained problematic for the Nigeria/Cameroon Mixed Commission and for Ambassador Ould Amedou, the UN Special Representative to the region, is the re-negotiation of oil contracts – or their abrogation – between the oil companies operating in the region and the Nigerian government. This would therefore necessitate the oil companies re-negotiating new exploration contracts with Cameroon now that the territory has been handed over to Cameroon. It is understood that the oil companies and the government of Cameroon have arrived at a tacit understanding which would allow the companies to continue their drilling process and pay royalties to the government of Cameroon.
On the whole and due to their relative advantage in terms of material and human endowments, Nigeria and Cameroon have natural roles to play as vehicles for achievement of sub-regional integration. Both must be determined, especially Nigeria, to facilitate Africa’s development and the realisation of the concept of an AU government for the continent which the Nigerian leadership has espoused. The attainment of the goals of the AU with regard to the United States of Africa and the options and concepts espoused by the Nigerian political leadership as a driving force behind the AU, cannot be achieved in an atmosphere of armed conflict, mistrust and contentious litigation. Multilateralism could be a good forum where such disputes could be effectively handled. The UN, AU, Commonwealth and the African Petroleum Producer Association (APPA) of which both are members could actively be disposed to act as facilitator, should the dispute arise again. However, because both countries have recognised the unproductive character of armed conflict, there is a genuine desire and spirit from both sides of the Bakassi Peninsula that the present status quo should be maintained. However, for the status quo to be maintained, this paper argues that:

- The Cameroon/Nigeria Mixed Commission should be a permanent structure where concerns and problems arising from the management of the disputed areas should be debated and solutions proffered.
- A joint military patrol should be established to monitor and intervene where and when it deems necessary. This is particularly important as several rebel groups have mushroomed in the peninsula, attacking both Nigerian and Cameroonian military posts in the disputed areas.
- Trade between the two countries should be encouraged.
- The development of transport and telecommunication infrastructure linking both countries should be encouraged. There are more than four million Nigerians in Cameroon and there should be means and ways whereby these people can travel home and communicate with loved ones.

Notes and References

6 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 The Monrovia Group comprised the 12 countries of the Brazzaville Group as well as Ethiopia, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo, Tunisia and Congo (Kinshasa). See n 12 below.
11 The Casablanca Group emerged in 1961, comprising seven countries: Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Mali and Morocco.
12 The Brazzaville Group comprised the 12 countries – Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Côte d’Ivoire, Dahomey (Benin), Gabon, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, the Central African Republic (CAR), Senegal and Chad – that had founded the African and Malagasy Union in 1960 in Brazzaville.
14 Ibid.
15 Ngoh op cit p. 258.
18 Ibid.
21 Cameroon Tribune, a government daily newspaper in Cameroon. These figures appeared in the 29 August edition, 32(2).
22 Njeuma, Z.M., 1985. Fulani Hegemony in Northern Yola (Old Adamawa). Yaounde: University of Yaounde Press, p. 78. See also lecture notes on the history of Cameroon (H15304) by Prof. Njeuma, at the University of Buea. He is also Prof. Emeritus at the University of Buea and member of the Cameroon International Boundary Commission.

25 He was speaking to the International press at The Hague before the 10 October 2002 verdict.
the concept of risk and its corollaries and going beyond the somewhat limited view employed appropriate methodological, conceptual and theoretical approaches. Organisations have addressed a number of complex and interlocking socio-

Risk analysis studies on Africa conducted by a number of international...